“We the People”

“We the people” has been a rousing call in this country from its citizens for hundreds of years and yet this simple introduction to our constitution has a cumulative complexity from millennia of intellectual thought. Many great men laid the foundation for a people to be capable of proclaiming their sovereignty, however without the revolutionary thinking of John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau, the sustainability of any civil society would have been theoretically unobtainable. Locke and Rousseau’s positions on legitimate authority, man’s positive state of nature, and the resilient social contract that the ruler and ruled must obey, led directly to the birth of national and popular sovereignty in 1789. These key elements have been the compass points on the map of political thought and action since that time, allowing the words “We the people” to ring true.

John Locke first established who could proclaim authoritative legitimacy when he wrote of the false principals of Sir Robert Filmer. The established understanding that kings had a divine right to power was finally removed from public acceptance when Locke questioned who was to inherit the paternal power of Adam. (1)   Locke pondered this question, which led him to conclude the following,

“The very person that is to rule is the ordinance of God, and by divine institution; tells us at large only that this person is the heir, but who this heir is he leaves us to guess; and so this divine institution, which assigns it to a person whom vie have no rule to know, is just as Good as an assignment to nobody at all.” (2)

 

Jean Jacques Rousseau easily agreed with Locke and yet took it a step further by identifying quite specifically, where legitimate power rests.

“This public person, so formed by the union of all other persons formerly took the name of city, and now takes that of Republic or body politic; it is called by its members, State when passive, Sovereign when active, and Power when compared with others like itself. Those who are associated in it take collectively the name of people, and severally are called citizens, as sharing in the sovereign power…” (3)

 

Political authority taken here, although rhetorically, from both religious and despotic authority and then placed so quickly and securely in the hands of the people themselves, seems nothing short of miraculous, if this would not have had thousands of years to stew and a people susceptible to the responsibilities this maneuver entailed. That being said, another less obvious change, albeit just as important, occurred as Locke and Rousseau questioned the absolute basics of being human, our state of nature.

Hobbes gave us the label of self-interested calculating machines, while Machiavelli defined us as just a rung above cattle whose history is meaningless. (4) When these two men’s opinions are just the tip of the iceberg of the general thoughts concerning humanity, then the writings of Locke and Rousseau come to us as a soft, continuous rain in a drought-laden land. Locke’s state of nature includes perfect freedom to order one’s actions, bound only by the law of nature, and includes the equality of men without subordination and an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty. (4a) If that sounds too good to be true, then Rousseau will knock your socks off with the portrait he paints of the human soul, which, only altered by society, had ‘celestial and majestic simplicity, impressed on it by its divine Author.’ (5) When philosophers or leaders look out onto humanity and speak of an inalienable right (6)  to not only exist but to guarantee no harm in life, health, liberty, or possessions, (7) where else could you possibly find the most successful revolutions of humankind?

Although this state of nature was elevated to new heights, the reality that individuals would have to abandon this state, renounce certain individual rights to gain the benefits of being part of a whole, was yet another gift, granted, partial penance, of political thought Locke and Rousseau gave to us. In the following quotations, you can see this briefly described.

“Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole… renouncing his original rights and natural liberty.” (8)

 

“Whosoever, therefore, out of a state of Nature unite into a community, must be understood to give up all the power necessary to the ends for which they unite into society to the majority of the community” (9)

 

Giving freely, or having personal liberties taken from you is certainly not a new historical phenomenon, however, giving with consent and having all others, no matter the status, do the same certainly is. This is where the social contract comes into play. Due to the precise nature in which these contracts, constitutions, were to be written and implemented, we find the unique sustainability before mentioned. John Locke ties together the social contract with the definition of sovereignty seamlessly below.

“What, then, strictly speaking, is an act of Sovereignty? It is not a convention between a superior and an inferior, but a convention between the body and each of its members. It is legitimate, because based on the social contract, and equitable, because common to all; useful, because it can have no other object than the general good, and stable, because guaranteed by the public force and the supreme power. So long as the subjects have to submit only to conventions of this sort, they obey no-one but their own will; and to ask how far the respective rights of the Sovereign and the citizens extend, is to ask up to what point the latter can enter into undertakings with themselves, each with all, and all with each.” (9)

 

To see the social contract as the ultimate equalizer of humanity is very easy to do, be that as it may, without the framework of the separation of powers initially introduced by Aristotle (9a) and later, given a more equitable base of checks and balances by Montesquieu, Locke, and Hume, (10) the social contract could have been just another failed attempt at social engineering. Here Rousseau quotes Montesquieu to drive home the issue that the establishment of a true republic, note he is not speaking of a democracy, is what shapes those of power. “At the birth of societies,” says Montesquieu, “the rulers of Republics establish institutions, and afterwards the institutions mould the rulers.” (11)

Rousseau was far from a fan of republics as he shows here, “Were there a people of gods, their government would be democratic. So perfect a government is not for men.” (11a) Preferring popular sovereignty while acknowledging a realistic need for, and yet distrust of national sovereignty, he states, “…every government in the world, once clothed with the public power, sooner or later usurps the sovereign authority.” (12) He describes two very different forms of public activity, that of the deliberative and the operative. As he would prefer all citizens to be just that, citizens, not subjects, he admitted that there is a place for a representative sovereignty of government due to the forgetful or irresolute citizenry. (13) His hesitancy of any definition of sovereignty outside the citizens’ hands, along with Locke encouraging those that have seen a long train of abuses to rouse themselves (14) to revolution, were the final connections the people of the 18th century needed to revolt against governments who did not consider the General Will (15)above their own.

This is a mere glance at just a few of the innumerable ways in which the political philosophies of John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau inspired the disheartened of the 18th century to rise up and replace their failed system of government and  confidently move forward with a constitution that was by the people, for the people, of the people. The societal schematic each man created, when combined, allowed the common person to not only believe in his own fundamental worth and equality, but to see that his sacrifice would be well rewarded with a sustainable social contract. The social contract they drew out showed a clear picture of what legitimate authority looks like and what reaction to the usurpation of sovereignty should be. There can be no question that Locke and Rousseau, whether they wrote the words or not, were directly responsible for the first three words of our glorious constitution, We the People!

 

 

 

 

 

Works Cited

  1. Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. London: Printed for Thomas Tegg; W. Sharpe and Son; G. Offor; G.and J. Robinson; J. Evans and Co.: Also R. Griffin and Co. Glasgow; and J. Gumming, Dublin.1823. Print. Essay I. Chapter XI
  2. Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. London: Printed for Thomas Tegg; W. Sharpe and Son; G. Offor; G.and J. Robinson; J. Evans and Co.: Also R. Griffin and Co. Glasgow; and J. Gumming, Dublin.1823. Print. Essay I. Chapter XI. Section 127
  3. Barker, Ernest. Social Contract. London: Oxford University Press. 1947. Print. Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract. Book I Section VII. On Sovereignty
  4. Portis, Edward Bryan. Reconstructing the Classics. Political Theory from Plato to Weber. Washington D.C. CQ Press. 2008. Print. Pg. 73, 86.

4a.  Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. London: Printed for Thomas Tegg; W. Sharpe …..and Son; G. Offor; G.and J. Robinson; J. Evans and Co.: Also R. Griffin and Co. Glasgow; …..and J. Gumming, Dublin.1823. Print. Essay II. Chapter II

  1. 5.       Rousseau, Jean Jacques. A Discourse on Inequality. Translated by G. D. H. Cole. www.munseys.com/diskone/ineq.pdf
  2. Barker, Ernest. Social Contract. London: Oxford University Press. 1947. Print. Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract. Book II Section II
  3. Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. Essay Two: Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government. Chapter I. Of Political Power. Section 6
  4. Barker, Ernest. Social Contract. London: Oxford University Press. 1947. Print. Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract. Book I Section VI
  5. Barker, Ernest. Social Contract. London: Oxford University Press. 1947. Print. Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract. Book II Section IV

9a.  Politics. Aristotle. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Batoche Books. Kitchener. 1999 Book III ……Section XI

  1. Dunning, William Archibald. A History of Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu. New York: The McMillan Company. London: McMillan & Co. 1905 Chapter XI
  2. Barker, Ernest. Social Contract. London: Oxford University Press. 1947. Print. Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract. Book II Section VII

11a.Barker, Ernest. Social Contract. London: Oxford University Press. 1947. Print. Jean-Jacques       ……Rousseau. The Social Contract. Book III Section IV

  1. Barker, Ernest. Social Contract. London: Oxford University Press. 1947. Print. Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract. Book III Section XVIII
  2. Portis, Edward Bryan. Reconstructing the Classics. Political Theory from Plato to Weber. Washington D.C. CQ Press. 2008. Print. Pg.124.
  3. Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. London: Printed for Thomas Tegg; W. Sharpe and Son; G. Offor; G.and J. Robinson; J. Evans and Co.: Also R. Griffin and Co. Glasgow; and J. Gumming, Dublin.1823. Print. Essay II. Chapter XIX.
  4. Barker, Ernest. Social Contract. London: Oxford University Press. 1947. Print. Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract. Book IV Chapter I

 

 

“We the People”

By

Betty J. Craipo

acraipo@yahoo.com

December 1st, 2011

 

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